Abstract
SYNOPSIS
LATAM was badly prepared for the LTE introduction and the regulatory progress
could also have been faster. On the other hand and in a point also made in the
report, every LTE network from the ones currently operational, except
Verizon's, can be thought to have launched too early or under makeshift
conditions. In June this year, the Swedish TeliaSonera network was already 18
months old, but due to the extreme LTE" device scarcity all this 2009 rush to
launch is of dubious use; in June the network had just 5K subs.
Significant early revenue generation by an LTE network is the criterion that
after all determines who was early and who was late.
In any event and bypassing Puerto Rico, LATAM was supposed to have three
launches happening this year; one is still likely to happen, the other two now
look like they are Q1-12 jobs.
In 2012, some heavy LATAM iron starts coming into the LTE market; Telcel in
Mexico and some of the Chilean MNOs, among others.
Additionally, LATAM for years now has demonstrated record financial growth and
also the best possible resilience in situations of worldwide crisis. In the
LTE context, the EU did not only loose its traditional position of leading the
wireless world, but it now appears as ready to drive the world to a prolonged
crisis that Soros believes is going to be worse than the Lehman Brothers
disaster.
Telefonica was not as explicit as Soros in commenting on its very recent
restructuring, but it anyway announced the layoff of 6,000 employees in Spain
and its focus to Latin America and especially Brazil. Finally, for the vendors
who are involved in chasing the perceived as high value LTE tickets in Russia
or China, LATAM LTE is possibly the best possible hedge against highly
volatile markets, or markets of questionable worth to international vendors.
The TeleAnalytics series of regional LTE publications starts with LATAM not
because the region promises hundreds of millions of subs, if for no other
reason due to the size of its population; the estimated LATAM LTE population
coverage figure at the bottom of the page is all telling. On the other hand,
LATAM is a juicy LTE market and its mobile broadband adoption is booming; 3.9M
new Brazilian 3G subs per quarter, or 3.2% of the on-the-average population
covered. LTE is coming at the right time to provide both an upgrade path to
LATAM's 3G subs and also to become LATAM's access-network engine for
basic-broadband provisioning.
The report is based on first hand research in 18 LATAM countries and the
report's relationship with the TeleAnalytics LTE-Networks Database is as
always bidirectional. On the one hand, data sets relevant to this publication
are pulled out from the database, while new research results specific to this
publication help improve the depth of the database coverage (middle figure).
By now the database covers 82 countries and 193 existing or upcoming LTE
networks; it has last been updated at the end of August 2011. The reasons for
this new line of LTE related publications are quite obvious; even a 300 pages
publication that deals with 82 countries and 193 networks can do nothing more
than stay with the very core issues and be very quick about them. On the
contrary, this publication can use the pages needed to illuminate everything
in the LATAM LTE space that needs to be illuminated, provide a wealth of
quantitative data sets in order to anchor the points made and also provide a
complete and updated set of higher resolution forecasts (see top figure below
and also the ToC).
In 2011, 6 small-peripheral LATAM countries started the process of 700 MHz LTE
allocations, long before their ASOs (Analog Switch Offs) are planned to
happen. This is the first time ever that such a bold move has been made on a
worldwide scale (ex-military UHF has been allocated before) and it does not
only change drastically the LTE context in these 6 markets; all of them from
Group-C, out of the three groups that the LATAM markets have been partitioned
in. The move also puts pressure on the major LATAM markets where the
Broadcasters, following well known EU patterns, would not even acknowledge the
feasibility of such undertakings.
LATAM's LTE can expect a 30%-35% reduction in the otherwise feasible 2015
annual service revenue if access to the 700 MHz band stays as is today and
also LTE will be given a partial only opportunity to be the key weapon in the
implementation of LATAM's National Broadband Plans. Due to the fact that for
political reasons the LATAM DTT is taking cover under an umbrella of
misconceptions, beautifications and half truths, the report addresses the
LATAM DTT nebula to the point needed, namely to the beyond nebulas
establishment of the fact that the 700 MHz band is badly needed by LATAM LTE
and that the band is also largely geographically vacant.
Growth and Resilience of the LATAM Markets
At the bottom of things, which LTE networks are literally early and which are
late is possibly something of interest to brand managers, but not to
accountants, Verizon's network, with its plethora of LTE devices and its more
than 1.7M subs. is really the only early LTE network worth talking about
today. On the other hand, it is doubtful if the Swedish TeliaSonera (5K subs,
18 months after launch) got its money worth by being the fist LTE MNO.
Similarly in May, the leisurely deployed NTT Do- CoMo LTE network (70% POP in
2015) had only 70K subs to show for. Finally, it is not evident who seen any
good coming out of the always around the corner, but never started Chinese or
Russian LTE.
Europe though has become the region of real concern for more than a year now,
as the financial markets subject it to recurrent use of wolfpack tactics. The
fact that EU launches are happening (the EU governments accelerated the
auctions, as the means to collect cash) does not necessarily mean that anybody
knows if and when Italy and Spain may wake up one day just to find the doors
to the debt markets shut.
LATAM recovered from the 2008 financial crisis, faster and more consistently
than any other region. Of course past performance in financial crises is in
general not a qualification for the next one, like the one that the EU is
cooking up. On the other hand, it has been already remarked that LATAM is not
only a juicy LTE market, but possibly the best regional market for vendors and
international operators that want to hedge their bets in other much more
volatile regional LTE markets and against what the EU management cacophony can
have in store for everybody. The bottom figure shows the LATAM post 2002-3
record growth rates and also the fact that LATAM continued on this growth path
shortly after the worst of the last crisis was over.
LATAM's Broadband Adoption: Wireline Availability & Quality
It is obvious that one of the key enablers of rapid LTE adoption is the
existence of a weak wireline broadband market, which at the same time is not
unduly constrained by the consumer's pocket depth. As extensively documented
in the report, LATAM's wireline broadband adoption is simply bad.
Establishing that poor wireline adoption is not due to some kind of
idiosyncrasy of the market, it first of all requires a look at the possibility
of the wireline availability chocking broadband adoption.
As documented, the answer to this investigation is almost universal across
LATAM and the graph below illustrates the Brazilian situation; the number of
POTS lines per 100 POP currently in service is not even 1/3 of what Canada had
back in 2001. Moving past wireline availability, the quality of the copper
plant is the second most significant wireline broadband enabler and on this
front the LATAM stories are often horror ones. Two year ago, the Brazilian
Telefonica was ordered to curtail its ISP operations up until it improved the
reliability of its Speedy broadband product. This year, the Courts instructed
the regulator to open an investigation on issues related to the quality of the
Oi broadband offerings.
The points above are sufficient to establish in a preliminary way the under
serviced nature of the LATAM Broadband market, but there is still the question
of the consumer wanting or not to spend on broadband. In Brazil, the 3G subs
surpassed the wireline broadband connections in early 2010 and the same will
happen in Chile around April 2012. Furthermore in Brazil, the 3G connections
are about to surpass the number of POTS lines in service (bottom figure).
Substantial more evidence is included in the report towards establishing the
fact that LATAM's wireline broadband market as a whole is under serviced due
to the availability-quality of the wireline infrastructure and that the
consumer is ready to pay for a broadband solution that is widely available and
does not go off three times in the same evening. Understandably, such a
situation
The State of LATAM's 3G Networks & 700 MHz LTE
As discussed in the report, in a wide range of countries it was always totally
feasible to run a DTT campaign (as the whole of South America currently does),
while at the same time freeing the Upper UHF (in the LATAM case, the 700 MHz
band). Peru is just about ready to be the first country worldwide to break the
EU-in-origin and totally political motivated mythology, which portrayed
Telecoms as having to wait for the ASO (Analog Switch Off) before they could
gain access to the UHF. Understandably, in the EU Broadcasting way of thinking
(almost universally obeyed by the EU governments) allowing access to " their
frequencies" by Telecoms was bad enough; no rush was needed and the
government and the MNOs had to be squeezed first for all that they were worth.
Although no signs of a " LATAM 700 MHz conspiracy" exist, five more
small-peripheral markets joined the LATAM 700 MHz club this year, a witness to
the fact that the problems associated with the extreme political power of
LATAM Broadcasting are somewhat localized in the 4-5 top markets.
Unfortunately and as analyzed, these are exactly the markets that need the 700
MHz band most.
For reason discussed but too lengthy to get in them here, LATAM LTE needs the
700 MHz band even in urban centers, A view on the fact that LATAM's 3G is a
poor man's 3G (Chilean 3G is quite better) is provided by the figure below.
It is evident that many consumers in these expanding pools of 3G subs (35M
Brazilians at the end of 2011) are likely to upgrade to a reasonably priced
LTE offering, provided that a measurable performance improvement is delivered.
As analyzed, in LATAM this performance boost will many times be weakly only
provided by 2.6 GHz LTE, even in relatively dense urban areas.
Brazil & UHF-LTE Commitments in Six LATAM Countries
As analyzed, the common characteristic of the four out of the six LATAM
countries that jumped in the 700-MHz-LTE bandwagon is their non cooperative
spatial population distribution.
The rather well known LATAM champion of such non cooperativeness is Brazil,
which at the same time is well on its way of having more than half the 3G
LATAM subs and which this year is on the avenge bringing in 3.9M New-3G-Adds
per quarter, The graph of the Brazilian spatial population distribution is
just one of the several used to illuminate the fact that in the biggest LATAM
market, the usage of the 2.6 GHz band, to be dispensed by the regulator next
year, is hardly what is needed. Brazil is a country that its relatively
densely populated coastal strip is often more than 700 km wide, it has more
than 4,800 municipalities and more than 2.340 of these municipalities have
population counts between 10K and 40K. These human settlements can hardly be
ignored by an LTE network (they account for more than 22% of the total
population) and at the same time there is nothing cheap about covering them
with 2.6 GHz LTE.
In spring this year, SKT proposed to the Brazilian government to be allowed to
invest $1.8B behind an LTE satellite based project. As discussed all signs is
that this project will go ahead, but LTE is not Broadcasting and
Satellite-only LTE is poor man's LTE. In any event, SKT will at a minimum
provide coverage for the last 10%-12% of the Brazilian population that after
so many years not even 2G managed to cover. Unfortunately for an additional
about 30% of the population, 2.6 GHz LTE is a very expensive proposition and
the 2.6 GHz LTE MNOs are likely to address this segment of the market only
several years after launch. In short, a key finding of the report is that
in LATAM access to the 700 MHz band is not much of an option and GSMA's
suggestion that a 700 MHz Brazilian auction can bring in more than $6B is
realistic.
SBTVD's Deadlock and the Largely Vacant 700 MHz Band
SBTVD (Brazilian System of Digital TV) was structured as to allow for
increased competitiveness of the sizeable Brazilian TV-Sets
assembly-manufacturing business and at the same time align with the demands of
the all powerful Brazilian Broadcasters. After the total commercial failure of
the Brazilian-made Ginga (DTT middleware), the local TV-sets vendors can not
really claim that SBTVD done anything good to their fortunes. At the same
time, the Broadcaster's idea of for ever propagating their monopoly on
programming and distribution (in 2006 when the DTT solutions was adopted, more
than 90% of the Brazilian TV households were using off-air TV) was a badly
conceived one. The cost of TV Digitalization only through terrestrial means is
prohibitive for Brazil, if it was to be spread out over any reasonable number
of years.
About $1.1B of soft Japanese loans were passed to the Broadcasters in order to
digitalize their transmission sites and their studios. At no point in time in
the 3.5 years after the DTT launch in December 2007, anybody volunteered any
estimate (not to say plan) what the Brazilian TV digitalization will after all
cost. This " start doing it and it will work" philosophy was applied to a
country that for reasons discussed has more than 10,000 TV transmission sites
and where FTA (Free to the Air) TV does not have the pocket for these kind of
heroics; the Brazilian TV Ad Spending per Capita is still less than1/6 of the
US figure.
As a result of biting more than it can be chewed, by late 2010 the Brazilian
DTT got stuck due to lack of funds after Digitalizing only 103 sites which are
claimed to cover 480 of the almost 5,000 Brazilian municipalities. In other
words, $1.1B was spent just to cover what is easy (major urban centers) and
nobody is talking about who is going to pay for the continuation of the fun.
As a result, the Brazilian 700 MHz band is vacant (and it will remain vacant)
in geographies that are home to about 50% of the Brazilians. Rede Globo, the
major and controversial Brazilian Broadcaster, after being instrumental in
having the state commit all this spectrum to DTT, was the first one to jump
ship. As of June 2010, it operates a DTH based system for its own channels,
with the reception being disabled wherever terrestrial transmissions exist.
The photo above is from the Google Earth based interface to this unusual (to
put it mildly) system.
LTE & LATAM's National Broadband Plans
Both Argentina and Brazil are among the LATAM countries that decided to
address LATAM's low broadband adoption by adopting National Broadband Plans,
although what is entailed in every case is very different. As discussed, the
Brazilian Plan (BNPL) is a very limited initiative affecting a small
percentage of the population and having a very high cost per household. The
resurrected Telebras that is running the Brazilian project absorbs 1/3 of the
funding and it is possible that the cost would have been lower if the project
was to involve the private sector more extensively. The 5 years BNPL project
has neither publicly released timeline, nor milestones, but the same is
correct as well in the case of the much bigger and more ambitious Argentinean
plan. This second plans targets nothing less than a full blown national
backbone, along with not well defined regional fiber networks and even some
limited initiatives in the access part of the business.
Upgrading the LATAM backbones is of course needed, but both plans fail to say
how they plan to improve the access networks, except by implicitly leaving
this task to the ones that failed to do it before: the wireline ISPs. Building
even a semi descent LATAM wireline access infrastructure is an option that is
not worth pursuing, simply because the budgets that can be made available are
not any place close to what is needed. At the same time, both plans make much
of the very popular in LATAM catch all expression of " social inclusion" ,
when the only way that such inclusion can be serviced is by LTE-based access
networks, operating in the 700 MHz band, at least in parts of the intended to
be covered geography.
The research carried out establishes that Argentina and Brazil are not about
to join LATAM's 700 MHz club in a rush. On the other hand at least now, the
topic is talked about and the Brazilian regulator apparently could not find
sufficient grounds to deny a 700 MHz trial license to the military police,
which has very recently started a 700 MHz LTE Sao Paulo trial with
Alcatel-Lucent. It is not at all evident that a Brazilian MNO can get a 700
MHz trial license and very recent pro-Broadcasting statements by Anatel's (the
regulator) President, either should not have been made or at a minimum they
should have been left for Government ministers to make them.
Table of Contents
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- 1.1. QUALITATIVE POINTS
- 1.1.1. LATAM and the Historical Instance
- 1.1.2. The Report's Structure and the LATAM LTE Market
- 1.1.3. The LATAM LTE Timeline
- 1.1.4. The LATAM LTE Engaged, Covered, Adopting Populations & the
Brazilian Case
- 1.1.5. The LTE Adoption and Service Revenue in the Three LATAM Country
Groups
- 1.1.6. The Six 700 MHz LTE LATAM Countries & the Partially Vacant
Brazilian 700 MHz Band
- 1.1.7. The Evolution of the LATAM E-UTRA Bands-Pairs
- 1.1.8. The Evolution of the LATAM LTE Silicon & Device Sales- Revenue
- 1.1.9. The LATAM LTE Bottom Line
- 1.2. QUANTITATIVE POINTS
- 1.2.1. LATAM LTE Evolution: Networks, Countries & Coverage
- 1.2.2. LATAM LTE Evolution: Subs & Service Revenue
- 1.2.3. LATAM LTE Evolution: Device-Silicon Sales & Revenue
- 1.2.4. LATAM LTE Evolution: Spectrum Segmentation of the LTE Networks,
Subs & Device Sales
- 1.2.5. LATAM & Worldwide LTE: Evolution of the Relative Positioning
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LATAM CELLULAR & INTERNET MARKETS AND THE LTE INTRODUCTION
- 2.1. LATAM'S IMPROVING PROSPERITY
- 2.2. SEGMENTATION OF THE LATAM
- 2.3. OVERVIEW AND STATUS OF LATAM'S CELLULAR MARKETS
- 2.4. THE EVOLUTION OF LATAM'S 3G
- 2.5. LATAM'SWIRELINE INTERNETMARKET
- 2.6. THE OVERALL CHALLENGES OF LATAM' LTE SPECTRUM AND PROGRESS MADE
- 2.7. LATAM'S OVERALL LTE TIMELINE
3. THE DEGREE OF LATAM'S LTE PREPAREDNESS AND LATAM'S LTE SPECTRUM
- 3.1.WORLDWIDE AND LATAMLTE SPECTRUM
- 3.1.1. Digital Dividend: Facts-Mechanisms & LATAM Post-ASO and Pre-ASO
UHF LTE
- 3.1.2. LATAM's Cellular Bands and LTE
- 3.1.3. LATAM's 2.6 GHz Band (IMT 2000 Expansion)
- 3.2.WORLDWIDE E-UTRA PAIRS IN USE OR PLANNED TO BE USED COUNTRIES AND
ANALYSES
- 3.3. LATAMLTE E-UTRA PAIRS AND SPECTRUM SHARES (SUBS)
- 3.4. LATAM'S LTE BANDS AND KEY LATAM LTE CHARACTERISTICS
- 3.4.1. LTE Propagation and E-UTRA Bands
- 3.4.2. LATAM's Town-Rural LTE Coverage
- 3.4.3. Worldwide Popularity of the LATAM E-UTRA Pairs & LATAM LTE
Network Capacity
- 3.5. LATAM'S LTE SPECTRUM MAP (AS OF AUGUST 2011)
4. LATAM GROUP-A: ARGENTINA &BRAZIL: LTE SPECTRUM, AUCTIONS, DEPLOYMENTS & TIMELINES
- 4.1. ARGENTINA
- 4.1.1. The Argentinean Mobile and Internet Markets
- 4.1.2. The Argentina Connected Plan
- 4.1.3. The Slow Going Argentinean Spectrum Auctions & Commercial
Argentinean LTE
- 4.1.3.1. The Badly Delayed AWS Auction
- 4.1.3.2. The Recent 2.6 GHz Band Transaction
- 4.1.3.3. The Auction of the Unifon-Movicom Spectrum & the Spectrum Caps
- 4.1.3.4. The Arsat Spectrum Requirements
- 4.1.4. Conclusions on the Argentinean LTE Path
- 4.2. BRAZIL....
- 4.2.1. The Status and the Options of the Brazilian LTE Market
- 4.2.1.1. The Warming Up of the Brazilian Government towards LTE and
the Mainline Option
- 4.2.1.2. The SKT and the 700 MHz Brazilian LTE Options
- 4.2.2. LTE & the Brazilian Mobile Market
- 4.2.2.1. The Brazilian Cellular Players
- 4.2.2.2. The Brazilian Spatial Population Distribution and the LTE
Coverage Challenges
- 4.2.2.3. The Evolution of the Brazilian Cellular Market and its Metrics
- 4.2.3. The Evolution of the Brazilian Mobile Broadband
- 4.2.3.1. Brazilian 3G Population Coverage: Implications to the LTE
Networks
- 4.2.3.1.1. Evolution of the Brazilian MNO-Specific and Average 3G
Coverage
- 4.2.3.1.2. Comparative Analysis: Brazilian MNO-Specific and Average
2G and 3G Coverage
- 4.2.3.1.3. Implications to the LTE Brazilian Coverage in the 2.6 GHz
Band
- 4.2.3.2. Brazilian 3G Adoption & 3G Device Types: Implications to the
LTE Business
- 4.2.4. LTE and the Brazilian Internet Market
- 4.2.5. MMDS and the Brazilian 2.6 GHz LTE Band
- 4.2.6. The Brazilian National Broadband Plan, its Structure and Early
Experiences
- 4.2.7. BSTVD and the Brazilian 700 MHz Band
- 4.2.8. Conclusions on Brazilian LTE: Scenario Players, Intentions and
Timelines
- 4.3. APPENDIX I: SBTVD FACTS-TRENDS AND THE BRAZILIAN 700 MHZ LTE BAND
- 4.3.1. TV in Brazil
- 4.3.2. The Originally Two Priorities of the Brazilian DTT and What They
Netted
- 4.3.3. The Implementati on of the Brazilian DTT
- 4.3.4. The SBDTV Coverage
- 4.3.5. SBDTV UE Sales & Nominal SBDTV Penetration in the Brazilian
Households
- 4.3.6. The Brazilian TVDR, the 700 MHz Spectrum Hoarding & the Antenna
Wars by Other Means
- 4.3.7. Summary and Outlook of the Brazilian 700 MHz Band
5. LATAM GROUP-B MARKETS: LTE SPECTRUM, AUCTIONS, DEPLOYMENTS & TIMELINES
- 5.1. CHILE......
- 5.1.1. The Chilean Mobile and Broadband (Wireline and 3G) Internet
Markets
- 5.1.2. The Chilean Road to LTE and the Reasons for the Delays Witnessed
- 5.1.3. Conclusions on the Chilean LTE Timeline and Potential
- 5.2. MEXICO
- 5.2.1. The Mexican Mobile Market
- 5.2.2. The Mexican AWS Band
- 5.2.3. The Mexican 2.6 GHz Band
- 5.2.4. The Mexican 700 MHz Band
- 5.2.5. Summary of Mexican LTE and Outlook
- 5.3. VENEZUELA
- 5.4. PUERTO RICO
6. LATAM GROUP-C MARKETS: LTE SPECTRUM, AUCTIONS, DEPLOYMENTS & TIMELINES
- 6.1. LATAM SUBGROUP C1
- 6.1.1. Overview
- 6.1.2. Colombia
- 6.1.3. Paraguay
- 6.1.4. Peru...
- 6.1.5. Uruguay
- 6.1.6. Panama
- 6.2. LATAM SUBGROUP C2
- 6.2.1. Overview
- 6.2.2. Ecuador
- 6.2.3. Bolivia
- 6.2.4. Dominican R
- 6.2.5. Costa Rica
- 6.2.6. Guatemala
- 6.2.7. Honduras
- 6.2.8. Jamaica
- 6.2.9. Nicaragua
7. THE DIMENSIONING OF THE LATAM-LTE SUBS, SILICON, DEVICES&REVENUE
- 7.1. 2010-15 FORECASTS: ABBREVIATIONS, DEFINITIONS&NOTES
- 7.2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LTE COUNTRIES&NETWORKS - GROUPS A, B, C & LATAM
- 7.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LTE POPULATIONS (ENGAGED &COVERED) - COUNTRY
GROUPS A, B, C & LATAM September 2011
- 7.4. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LTE SUBSCRIBERS - GROUPS A, B, C & LATAM
- 7.5. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LTE'S ARPU AND SERVICE REVENUE - GROUPS A, B, C
& LATAM
- 7.6. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LTE'S DEVICE SALES&REVENUE - TYPE&GROUPS
BREAKDOWNS
- 7.7. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LTE'S SILICON SALES &REVENUE - GROUPS A, B, C &
LATAM
- 7.8. E-UTRA-PAIRS BASED SEGMENTATION: LATAMLTE NETWORKS.
SUBSCRIBERS&DEVICES
- 7.9. LATAM'S ANDWORLDWIDE LTE'S METRICS&POSITIONING
Table Of Figures
- Figure 1 The Different LATAM Speeds Towards Prosperity: Group A,B,C1,C2 &
LATAM
- Figure 2 LATAM's Regional Breakdown of Cellular Subs (M) and Mobile
Penetration
- Figure 3 LATAM's Top Ten Cellular Markets
- Figure 4 Average Quarterly Increase of the Data Revenue (2011, %): America
Movil & Telefonica LATAM
- Figure 5 LATAM's 3G Deployment Timeline
- Figure 6 LATAM' Data Revenue as a Percentage of Total
- Figure 7 Wireline Broadband Penetration per 100 Inhabitants (2010)
- Figure 8 LATAM's LTE Country Timeline
- Figure 9 The ITU 698-960 MHz Allocations
- Figure 10 The LATAM 700 MHz Map
- Figure 11 The TV Digitalization Process & Vacating the Upper UHF
- Figure 12 LATAM's 700 MHz Spectrum Share (Subs)
- Figure 13 LATAM's 2.1 GHz Spectrum Share (Subs)
- Figure 14 LATAM's AWS Spectrum Share (Subs)
- Figure 15 LATAM's 2.6 GHz Spectrum Share (Subs)
- Figure 16 LATAM E-UTRA-Pairs Shares (Subs,%)
- Figure 17 Relative Suburban LTE CAPEX and Typical Cell Size Versus
Operating Band
- Figure 18 Urbanization Ratio of the LATAM LTE Markets
- Figure 19 The LATAM Spectrum MAP
- Figure 20 Argentina Q4-10: Mobile Market Shares (M, %)
- Figure 21 The Evolution (AR) of the Broadband Platform Shares (%) and
Broadband Internet Subs (M)
- Figure 22 Urban, Rural & Deep Rural Broadband
- Figure 23 The Brazilian Spatial Population Distribution
- Figure 24 Brazilian LTE Geography
- Figure 25 South America: Night Light Satellite Image
- Figure 26 Q4-08 and Q2-11: 2G Brazilian Population Coverage
- Figure 27 Q2-11: Number of Municipalities Serviced by the Brazilian 2G
- Figure 28 Brazilian Spatial Population Distribution
- Figure 29 The Evolution of the Brazilian Cellular Adoption (M-Subs)
- Figure 30 The Evolution of the Brazilian Mobile Market Shares (%)
- Figure 31 MNO-Specific & Average Evolution of the Brazilian 3G Coverage
- Figure 32 Q2-11: 2G & 3G Brazilian Population Coverage (%)
- Figure 33 Q2-11: 2G & 3G Brazilian Municipalities Covered
- Figure 34 Population CDF (M,%%) of the Brazilian 2014 Soccer Cup Games
- Figure 35 Evolution of the Brazilian 3G Subs (M)
- Figure 36 Evolution of the Brazilian 3G Handset Usage (%)
- Figure 37 Penetration of Brazilian Subs in Av, Covered POP (%)
- Figure 38 Brazilian Wireline & Mobile Broadband Subscriber Evolution (M)
- Figure 39 Average Brazilian 3G Download Data-Rate Tests; Weekdays &
Weekends (KBits/sec)
- Figure 40 The Statistics of the Cities in PNBL
- Figure 41 LTE Geography & PNBL
- Figure 42 Brazilian Population CDF (Municipalities POP Count)
- Figure 43 Brazilian Spatial Population Distribution & SBDTV Sites-Coverage
- Figure 44 Brazilian LTE Coverage Scenario
- Figure 45 Brazil: TV, Pay TV & Off-Air Households (2004-10, M)
- Figure 46 Brazilian TV Sales: Local and Imported Split (M)
- Figure 47 The Evolution of the Brazilian DTT Population Coverage (%)
- Figure 48 SBTVD: Percentage Population Coverage of the Brazilian States
- Figure 49: Number of Digital Channels in 80 Major Brazilian Urban Centers
- Figure 50 The Evolution of the Fixed-SBTVD Annual Device Sales(M)
- Figure 51 Evolution of the SBTVD Penetration in All-TV & SBTVD-Covered
Households
- Figure 52 Chile: Mobile Market Shares & Mobile Penetration (2000-10)
- Figure 53 Chile: Crossover Between Wireline and Wireless Internet
Connections (M)
- Figure 54 Mexico Q2-11: Mobile Market Shares (M, %)
- Figure 55 Mexico: The 2.6 GHz Holdings (the whole band)
- Figure 56 Venezuela Q1-11: Broadband Connections
- Figure 57 Colombia Q4-10: Mobile Market Shares (M, %)
- Figure 58 Spectrum Holdings of the Colombian MNOs (MHz)
- Figure 59 Paraguay Q4-10: Mobile Market Shares (M,%)
- Figure 60 Peru: The Evolution of the Narrowband & Broadband Internet
Connections (M)
- Figure 61 Peru: The Evolution of Mobile Subs (M)
- Figure 62 Uruguay: Mobile Market Shares (Q1-11)
- Figure 63 Ecuador: Evolution of the Mobile Subs (M) and Market Shares (%)
- Figure 64 Bolivian Market Shares: Broadband Connections (Q2-10)
- Figure 65 Guatemala Q4-10: Mobile Market Shares (%)
- Figure 66 Guatemala: Fixed and Mobile Connections (to 2010, M)
- Figure 67 Jamaica Q4-10: Mobile Market Shares (%)
- Figure 68 Nicaragua: Mobile Penetration 2000-10 (%)
- Figure 28 The Relationship Between Silicon-Devices and Subs
- Figure 30 Very High Level View of Part of the Forecasting Model
- Figure 71 LTE Device & Silicon Pricing
- Figure 72 Monthly LATAM LTE ARPU
- Figure 73 Group A, B, C & LATAM: Evolution of the LTE Networks Per Country
- Figure 74 Group A,B,C & LATAM: Evolution of the LATAM LTE Countries
- Figure 75 Group A,B,C & LATAM: Evolution of the LATAM LTE Networks
- Figure 76 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE POP Engaged (M)
- Figure 77 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE POP Covered (M)
- Figure 78 H2-15 LATAM Country Groups: LTE POP-Covered Shares (M, %)
- Figure 79 H2-15 Group A, B, C & LATAM: Populations LTE-Engaged &
LTE-Covered (M)
- Figure 80 LATAM: LTE POP Engaged & Covered (M)
- Figure 81 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Penetration of Covered in Engaged POP
- Figure 82 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Subscribers (M)
- Figure 83 Group A, B, C & LATAM: Penetration of LTE Subs in LTE POP
Covered (M)
- Figure 84 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Monthly ARPU ($) & Service Revenue
($M)
- Figure 85 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Service Revenue per LTE Network ($M)
- Figure 86 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE All-Device Sales (M)
- Figure 87 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE All-Device Sales Revenue ($M)
- Figure 88 LATAM LTE: Devices Sold - Type Breakdown (M)
- Figure 89 2015 LATAM LTE: Devices Sold - Type Breakdown ($M, %)
- Figure 90 LATAM LTE : Devices-Sold Revenue - Type Breakdown (SM)
- Figure 91 2015 LATAM LTE: Devices-Sold Revenue - Type Breakdown ($M, %)
- Figure 92 LTE Silicon Unit Sales (M) - Group A, B, C & LATAM & LATAM's
Annual Silicon Revenue ($M)
- Figure 93 LATAM: Group A, B, C Silicon-Sales Shares (%)
- Figure 94 LATAM LTE Networks: E-UTRA-Pair Breakdown
- Figure 95 LATAM LTE Subs: E-UTRA-Pair Breakdown (%)
- Figure 96 LATAM LTE Device Sales: E-UTRA-Pair Breakdown (%)
- Figure 97 LATAM: Populations LTE-Engaged and LTE-Covered as Percentages of
the WW Figures
- Figure 98 LATAM: Subs as a Percentage of the WW Total
- Figure 99 LATAM: Number of LTE Countries and Networks as Percentages of
the WW Figures
- Figure 100 LATAM: LTE All-Devices (and Silicon) Sales as a Percentage of
the WW Figures
Table Of Tables
- Table 1 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Networks (2010-15)
- Table 2 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Countries (2010-15,)
- Table 3 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Coverage (%, 2010-15)
- Table 4 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE Subs (M, 2010-15)
- Table 5 Group A, B, C & LATAM: Annual LTE Service Revenue ($M, 2010-15)
- Table 6 Group A, B, C & LATAM: LTE All-Devices/Silicon (M, 2010-15)
- Table 7 Group A, B, C & LATAM: Annual LTE All-Devices Revenue ($M, 2010-15)
- Table 8 Group A, B, C & LATAM: Annual LTE Silicon Revenue ($M, 2010-15)
- Table 9 LATAM LTE Networks - E-EUTRA-Pairs Breakdown
- Table 10 LATAM LTE Subs (M) - E-EUTRA-Pairs Breakdown
- Table 11 LATAM LTE All-Devices Sales (M) - E-EUTRA-Pairs Breakdown
- Table 12 WW-LATAM: Population LTE-Covered (M)
- Table 13 WW-LATAM: LTE Subs (M)
- Table 14 WW-LATAM: LTE Countries
- Table 15 WW-LATAM: LTE Networks
- Table 16 WW-LATAM: LTE All-Devices (Silicon) Sales (M)
- Table 17 LATAM's Key LTE Issues
- Table 18 LTE-Oriented Segmentation of the LATAM Countries
- Table 19 Structure of the Analysis in Chapter 2
- Table 20 The E-EUTRA Classes
- Table 21 E-UTRA Bands in use (or to be used) & Mnemonics (Q2-11)
- Table 22 The Japanese & Korean LTE Spectrum Allocations
- Table 23 E-UTRA Pairs in use (or to be used) & Mnemonics (Q2-11)
- Table 24 LATAM E-UTRA Pairs in Use (or to be Used) - Q2-11
- Table 25 The Brazilian MNOs & Their Affiliations
- Table 26 The Main Brazilian ISPs and Their Q2-11 Market Shares
- Table 27 The Anatel Calculated SBDTV Coverage (April 2011)
- Table 28 The LTE Outlook in the Group-B of LATAM Countries
- Table 29 Colombian MNOs and Affiliations
- Table 30 The LTE Outlook in the Group-C of LATAM Countries
- Table 31 LTE Device Types and Abbreviations
- Table 32 LTE Device- Silicon Pricing & LATAM LTE ARPPU
- Table 33 LTE Device Types and Abbreviations
- Table 34 LATAM Groups: LTE Device Sales and Revenue (2015)
- Table 35 LATAM LTE Device Sales and Revenue (2015) - Device Type Breakdown
- Table 36 2015 E-EUTRA Based Segmentation of LATAM LTE Networks,
Subscribers & Devices
