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市場調查報告書

Hatch-Waxman Act的動向

Dynamics of Hatch-Waxman Generic Challenges and Impact of the Courts, the FTC, States, and Congress

出版商 Decision Resources, Inc.
出版日期 2006年12月 商品編碼 47719
內容資訊 英文 30 Pages
價格
本報告書已不再販售

本報告已在2011年12月21日停止出版。

簡介

1984年Hatch-Waxman Act實施當時,大型製藥企業創造了年度15∼26億美元的銷售額。另一方面,非專利藥品(後進藥品)企業的規模小,一直苦戰於將產品推向市場。

專門於醫療產業相關廣泛調查的美國市調公司 Decision Resources Inc. (總公司:麻薩諸塞州),針對包括Hatch-Waxman Act帶給非專利藥品的影響等動向進行調查分析,並系統整理調查結果後出版報告書 "Dynamics of Hatch-Waxman Generic Challenges and Impact of the Courts, the FTC, States, and Congress" 。

本報告書內容包括:Hatch-Waxman Act的目的與影響、未來預測、聯邦交易委員會的動向、影響醫藥產業的訴訟案件等。共計30頁的內容綱要摘記如下:

實施概要

隨著非專利藥品而崛起的多種動向

非專利藥品進入市場的風險

  • 20年來的變化
  • Apotex的非專利藥品Plavix與Sanofi-Aventis/Bristol-Myers Squibb的對抗
  • 有關於3倍損害賠償的誇大表現
    • Wanton及蓄意的侵害行為或惡意的訴訟
    • 與蓄意侵害專利相關的實驗性調查

對藥品開發企業下達暫停命令可以阻止非專利藥品進入市場嗎

  • 暫停命令相關法令修改
    • eBay 對 MercExchange
    • Abbott Labs 對 Andrx Pharma & Teva
  • 更簡明易懂的標準

聯邦交易委員會(FTC)對專利訴訟和解的挑戰

  • FTC的角色
  • Schering的案例
    • 法院支持和解的權利
    • 風險重新分配
    • 該案件最重要的要點
  • Tamoxifen的案例
    • 專利的範圍
    • 專利失效的事前確認
    • 「退款」是否過多
    • 第三方付費者及活動人士的動向
  • re Ciprofloxacin
  • Warner Chilcott的事例

州的積極角色

聯邦訴訟

  • 禁止退款
  • 禁止非專利藥品認證
  • 市民的陳情
  • 專利改革

未來預測

  • 醫療照護費用
  • 非專利藥品策略
  • Hatch-Waxman Act的未来

  • 非專利藥品製造商打進高風險的市場:2002年∼2006年
  • 專利侵權的3倍賠償趨勢
  • 專利訴訟和解協定:1993年∼2006年
  • 第109次美國議會之前的法案

  • Hatch-Waxman Act的訴訟架構
  • 相較於2004年非專利藥品製造商之1984年的主要製藥企業
  • 因Federal Trade Commission而起的藥品競爭活動
  • 2004年美國的個人醫療照護費用

目錄

Abstract

Introduction:

Multiple forces can affect the U.S. pharmaceutical market. Understanding their potential impact is critically important for effectively positioning products for market. In 2006, companies, the courts, the Federal Trade Commission, states, and Congress all struggled with how to respond to generics challenges. These entities' agendas are often at odds with one another, and pharmaceutical companies must continuously devise new strategies to remain competitive

Get the Answers You Need to Shape Your Strategy:

  • In 1984, when the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the largest pharmaceutical companies had annual worldwide sales of $1.5-2.6 billion. In comparison, generics companies were quite small and struggled to bring products to market. How has Hatch-Waxman changed this scenario over the last 20 years?
  • The suggestion that a generics manufacturer that launches a drug before the drug' s patent has expired could be liable for treble damages is exaggerated. What steps can and do generics manufacturers take to avoid such damages?
  • One operative procedure for preventing a competing generics product from reaching the market is a motion for a preliminary injunction. What two court decisions will make it more difficult for an innovator company to obtain such an injunction?
  • The most politically charged and publicly prominent area of dispute in Hatch-Waxman litigations is pretrial settlement agreements between innovator and generics companies. How has the FTC tried to challenge pretrial settlement agreements?
  • Several bills are before the 109th Congress that will affect the pharmaceutical industry if they become law. Which bills are they, and what will their impact be?

Scope:

The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984: its initial intent, its impact, and its future

Preliminary injunctions: their weakening power

The FTC: its attempts to weaken patent law

States: states' actions through their attorneys general to make drugs more affordable

Federal legislation that could affect the pharmaceutical industry: bills in Congress relating to reverse payments in settlement agreements, authorized generics, citizen petitions, and patent reform

Table of Contents

  • Executive Summary
    • Strategic Considerations
    • Stakeholder Implications
  • Multiple Dynamics in Generics Challenges
  • At-Risk Launch of Generics
    • Twenty Years of Change
    • Apotex Challenges Sanofi-Aventis/Bristol-Myers Squibb over Generic Plavix
    • Hyperbole About Treble Damages
      • Wanton and Willful Infringement or Bad Faith Litigation
      • Empirical Studies in Willful Patent Infringement
  • Can the Innovator Stop Generic Market Entry with a Preliminary Injunction?
    • Changing Law Regarding Injunctions
      • eBay v. MercExchange
      • Abbott Labs v. Andrx Pharms and Teva (Abbott Case)
    • An Easier Obviousness Standard
  • FTC Challenges to the Settlement of Patent Litigation
    • The Role of the FTC
    • The Schering Case
      • Courts Uphold the Right to Settle
      • Redistribution of Relative Risk
      • Crux of the Issue
    • The Tamoxifen Case
      • Scope of the Patent
      • Prior Holding of Patent Invalidity
      • Is the "Reverse Payment" Excessive?
      • Status of Third-Party Payers and Activists
    • In re Ciprofloxacin
    • The Warner Chilcott Case
  • Proactive Role of the States
  • Proposed Federal Legislation
    • Prohibiting Reverse Payments
    • Banning Authorized Generic Drugs
    • Citizen Petitions
    • Patent Reform
  • Outlook
    • Health Care Costs
    • Generics Strategies
    • Hatch-Waxman' s Future

Tables

  • 1. Select At-Risk Launches by Generics Companies, 2002-2006
  • 2. Infrequency of Treble Damages Awards in Patent Infringement
  • 3. Select Patent Litigation Settlement Agreements, 1993-2006
  • 4. Select Bills Before the 109th U.S. Congress

Figures

  • 1. Hatch-Waxman Framework for Litigation
  • 2. Top 1984 Pharmaceutical Companies Compared with Top 2004 Generics Companies
  • 3. Federal Trade Commission' s Pharmaceutical Competition Activities
  • 4. U.S. Expenditures for Personal Health Care, 2004 .............................................................
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